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3.1  Location and Internalization  Decisions of Multinational Enterprises 
The motivation for foreign direct investment (FDI) is often analyzed in 
the OLI framework (Dunning 1993). Considering an advantage based on 
the ownership (0)  of firm-specific assets such as technology and manage- 
rial ability, a firm decides how far it internalizes activities (I) and where it 
locates them (L). The firm maximizes its profits by making decisions on 
internalization and location at the same time. The previous theoretical and 
empirical  literature  on  FDI,  however,  has  concentrated  on  location 
choices and has largely neglected internalization choices. 
In theory, Horstman and Markusen (1992), for example, formalized en- 
dogenous investment decisions in the trade-off between arm’s-length ex- 
ports and FDI. However, they did not include possible vertical division of 
labor between a parent firm and a foreign affiliate. To the author’s knowl- 
edge, the literature on vertical integration in industrial organization theory 
has not yet been incorporated into the international trade theory of divi- 
sion of labor in an operational format. As for empirical study, there is an 
extensive literature on location choices of FDI; Smith and Florida (1994) 
and Head, Ries, and Swenson (1995) are examples for Japanese multi- 
national enterprises (MNEs) in the United States along this line. However, 
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these studies generally treat location choices independent of internaliza- 
tion decisions. They analyze why an affiliate in a certain industry is located 
in country A instead of country B. However, they do not make any direct 
inference about the function of the affiliate in the business strategy of the 
firm group or the nature of transactions among the parent firms and af- 
filiates. As Yamawaki (1998) argued, empirical studies of internalization 
have been much thinner and have not been fully integrated with studies 
of location. 
Decisions about internalization take various forms in the international 
setting. A firm usually conducts a number of activities or functions. These 
consist of (1) a headquarters function including overall planning, financial 
management, personnel management, and legal services, (2) production 
activities including R&D, technology management, production control, 
quality control, and purchases and inventory control of parts and compo- 
nents, and (3) marketing activities including marketing surveys and plan- 
ning, inventory control of products, logistics arrangement, advertisement, 
and others. Considering firm-specific assets and the saving of transaction 
costs, a firm decides what activities and functions are to be internalized 
and what to be left for other firms and at the same time geographically 
locates the internalized activities and functions. Particularly in the context 
of international operations, an important decision is whether the head- 
quarters function is placed only at the parent firm or is partially dispersed 
across foreign affiliates. Internalization decisions about the value chain of 
production  and distribution are also made while considering locational 
advantages all over the world. A firm decides the boundary of its activities 
over the value chain, slices the internalized activities, and disperses them 
over a number of locations. The upstream and downstream boundaries of 
the firm can be fuzzy if, for example, the firm has long-term outsourcing 
contracts with other firms. 
Empirical studies of internalization face serious difficulties in statistical 
quantification.  It is usually difficult to match  statistical data for parent 
firms with those for their foreign affiliates. Even if we can match the data, 
it is almost impossible to obtain detailed information on differences in 
activities or functions of parent firms and affiliates. Moreover, we cannot 
quantify physical transactions between parent  firms and their  affiliates 
in many cases. In addition, internalization decisions are deeply rooted in 
the nature of firm-specific assets, and thus statistical aggregation is often 
difficult. 
There is, however, statistically tractable internalization data in the case 
of Japanese MNEs. The Basic Survey of Business Structure and Activity 
conducted  by  Japan’s  Ministry  of  International  Trade  and  Industry 
(MITI) provides detailed data on firms in Japan and their foreign affiliates 
with census coverage. The questionnaire-level microdata are matched be- 
tween parent firms in Japan and their foreign affiliates. We can thus obtain Location and Internalization Decisions  81 
information on what sorts of  Japanese firms have how many and what 
sorts of foreign affiliates. We place our focus on sectoral choices of parent 
firms and foreign affiliates over manufacturing  and wholesale or retail 
trade. Some manufacturing parent firms have only manufacturing foreign 
affiliates while others have wholesale or retail trade foreign affiliates. Some 
wholesale or retail trade parent firms have manufacturing foreign affiliates, 
and others do not. These differences in  affiliate-holding patterns  come 
from differences  in internalization decisions. 
When a manufacturing parent firm has one or more nonmanufacturing 
foreign affiliates, or when  a nonmanufacturing  parent firm has  one or 
more manufacturing foreign affiliates, we  say that “sector switching” oc- 
curs. Sector switching of course does not necessarily imply that foreign 
affiliates conduct activities completely different from those of their parent 
firms. Parent firms usually have broader activities than their affiliates, and 
the secondary activity of a parent firm may  be identical to the activity 
of its affiliate. However, from the concordance and discordance of major 
activities we  can infer the width of internalization along the value chain 
of  production  and distribution.  By  incorporating  the characteristics of 
parent firms, we  can analyze internalization decisions in the context of the 
international operation of  MNEs. This approach does not cover all fea- 
tures of internalization, but it provides a precious trial to capture an im- 
portant cross section of internalization decisions. 
There are a number of studies on the choice of activities of MNEs in 
the literature on management and international  business, but  they  are 
mostly based on case studies or anecdotal evidence. It is thus worthwhile 
to try to capture the internalization behavior of  MNEs with comprehen- 
sive  statistical data. In this sense, MITI’s data are an indispensable re- 
source that deserves careful investigation. This paper proves that internal- 
ization decisions are an essential element in analyzing the behavior of 
MNEs and are particularly important to understanding the characteristics 
of Japanese firms. 
Section 3.2 gives an overview of manufacturing and nonmanufacturing 
sector switching by Japanese parent firms and foreign affiliates and claims 
that internalization and location choices reveal some key features of Japa- 
nese MNEs. Statistical figures for U.S. MNEs are also presented for com- 
parison. Section 3.3 analyzes statistical data on sector switching from the 
foreign affiliate side, while section 3.4 approaches from the parent side. 
Section 3.5 summarizes the findings and lists agenda for future research. 
3.2  Sector Switching by Japanese Multinational Enterprises 
In both the academic and journalistic  literature, Japanese MNEs are 
claimed to be different from MNEs of other nationalities in some impor- 
tant ways. There is a set of anecdotal “stylized facts” on Japanese MNEs. 82  Fukunari Kimura 
Although they are stylized in the sense that rigorous empirical confirma- 
tion remains to be done carefully, it is of interest that most of them are 
related to sector switching and internalization decisions. 
First, it is well known that many Japanese manufacturers have wholesale 
trade foreign affiliates, particularly in developed countries. A large propor- 
tion of these parent firms belong to the general machinery, electric ma- 
chinery, and transport equipment industries, in which products are differ- 
entiated, fringe and aftercare services are important, and capturing local 
market niches is the key to selling products. Having foreign affiliates in the 
wholesale trade sector is an example of downward internalization. Yama- 
waki (1991) claimed that wholesale trade affiliates of Japanese firms in 
the United States help to expand Japanese exports to the United States. 
However, if we  interpret the issue as simply whether to make arm’s-length 
exports or to sell exported products through wholesale trade affiliates, we 
may misunderstand the current stage of globalization of Japanese firms. 
Since the latter half of the 1980s, the international activities of Japanese 
firms have expanded  dramatically. Large Japanese manufacturers,  typi- 
cally in the automobile, consumer electronics, and office machine indus- 
tries, do not just have wholesale trade affiliates for exported goods but 
establish foreign affiliates for both production and distribution while tak- 
ing strong home country effects into consideration. Since major MNEs 
have constructed extensive worldwide networks of production and distri- 
bution, a simple story of export versus FDI may not be entirely relevant. 
It is necessary to specify the activities of foreign affiliates and analyze the 
overall strategy of Japanese MNEs. 
Second, Japanese MNEs are often claimed to export a vertical keiretsu 
structure formed by multiple Japanese companies. The competitive edge of 
the Japanese manufacturing sector is found in industries in which efficient 
subcontracting arrangements are established. With efficient subcontract- 
ing arrangements, small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) do not have 
to internalize a wide range of activities but can concentrate on production 
activities while keeping themselves slim. In the globalization era, it is ob- 
served that SMEs, particularly competitive ones, move their production 
plants to foreign countries together with their major clients. They try to 
keep subcontracting relationships  with  customers, which can be  inter- 
preted as loose internalization arrangements. In this sense, the no-sector- 
switching cases of SMEs-that  is, manufacturing to manufacturing-are 
also related to internalization, in contrast to the sector-switching cases of 
large MNEs. Although the agglomeration effect of Japanese FDI to the 
United States has been pointed out by Smith and Florida (1994) and Head 
et al. (1995), we must examine it in more detail to see whether the effect is 
generated in a horizontal manner or in the form of vertical subcontracting 
systems. In East Asia, it is more important for Japanese MNEs to trans- 
plant subcontracting systems because local indigenous supporting indus- Location and Internalization Decisions  83 
tries  are immature.  In  Malaysia  and Thailand,  for  example, Japanese 
SMEs have formed the first and second layers of subcontracting systems 
upstream of large Japanese MNEs, particularly in the electric and elec- 
tronic machinery industries. 
Third, in a recent phenomenon  a number of Japanese wholesale and 
retail trade companies have established manufacturing plants abroad and 
imported from them, particularly from East Asian countries. This is an 
example of upward internalization, which probably is not often observed 
for MNEs of different nationalities. It may be based partly on the tradition 
of product development by Japanese trading companies and partly on the 
desire to avoid the rent-capturing or inefficient  existing distribution system 
in Japan. Although Kimura and Kohama (1997) tried to quantify this type 
of sector switching to some extent, there is certainly room for more for- 
mal investigation. 
Fourth, general trading companies (GTCs) are one of the major compo- 
nents of the Japanese economic system (Yoshino and Lifson 1986). GTCs 
establish their affiliates and branches all over the world and set up net- 
works of information and distribution. As discussed in Kimura and Ko- 
hama (1997), they seek economies of scope in terms of the number of com- 
modities to handle and the functions to conduct. The functions include 
not only commodity trading but also matchmaking in setting up joint ven- 
tures, finance and insurance, construction and management of industrial 
estates, among others. As theoretically formalized in Kimura and Talmain 
(1994), GTCs work as a device through which other, client companies can 
avoid internalizing distribution functions. Statistical, comprehensive anal- 
ysis of the activities of GTCs, however, is yet to come. 
It is thus obvious that internalization is one of the key concepts in un- 
derstanding the globalization pattern of Japanese firms. Sector switching 
or nonswitching between manufacturing and nonmanufacturing reveals 
some of the major  characteristics  of Japanese MNEs. Past analyses of 
this topic, however, have not been statistically comprehensive but rather 
anecdotal. What this paper relies on is data from MITI’s Basic Survey of 
Business Structure and Activity. This survey was first conducted in fiscal 
year 1991, then in fiscal year 1994, and annually afterward. The main pur- 
pose of the survey is to capture an overall picture of Japanese corporate 
firms in terms of their activity diversification, internationalization, and 
strategy on R&D and information technology. The strength of the survey 
is the comprehensiveness of its samples and the reliability of its figures. 
1. Since the subcontracting relationship is long term in nature, it sometimes works as an 
obstacle to the restructuring of industrial organization in Japan. An interesting anecdotal 
observation is that the globalization of interfirm relationships reshuffles rigid subcontracting 
relationships. Even if  the match between upstream and downstream firms is the same, the 
prices of parts and components typically become more competitive abroad than in domes- 
tic transactions. 84  Fukunari Kimura 
We must, however, be careful because the survey only covers large domes- 
tic firms and large foreign affiliates in  specific industries. The domestic 
firms covered have more than fifty workers, have capital of more than 30 
million yen, and own establishments in the mining, manufacturing, whole- 
sale and retail trade, or restaurant industry. The foreign affiliates must 
have more than 50 percent Japanese ownership and capital of more than 
$1 million and must conduct mining, manufacturing, or commerce activi- 
ties.*  We will use the questionnaire-level  fiscal year 1994 data. Because the 
survey does not yet provide long time-series data, it is difficult to analyze 
entry and exit decisions directly. However,  it yields precious information 
on the connection between parent firms in Japan and foreign affiliates. 
Before moving forward, we take an overview of the data on manufactur- 
ing and commercial affiliates of Japanese firms in comparison with such 
affiliates of U.S. firms (see table 3.l).’ The Japanese data are from MITI’s 
published report on the 1994 Basic Survey of Business Structure and Ac- 
tivity (hereinafter BS94) while the U.S. data are derived from a publication 
of the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce (here- 
inafter FAUSF94). 
Note that figures for foreign affiliates of Japanese firms (FAJFs) are not 
perfectly  comparable  with  those  for  foreign  affiliates  of  U.S.  firms 
(FAUSFs). FAUSF94 covers finance and a wide range of  other service 
industries while BS94 does not. “Gross prod~ct”~  is used for value added 
in the case of FAUSFs while value added is calculated by subtracting pur- 
chases from sales in the case of FAJFs. We also have to be careful because 
FDI between Japan and the United States is so asymmetrical that we  can- 
not directly compare figures for FAJFs with those for FAUSFS.~ 
Despite a number of  statistical reservations, table 3.1 suggests several 
important differences between FAJFs and FAUSFs. First of all, combina- 
tions of manufacturing parents and wholesale trade affiliates are indirectly 
observed for both Japanese and U.S. MNEs. A difference, however, is that 
wholesale trade  FAJFs have  small value-added ratios and large value- 
added productivity, compared with FAUSFs, which may imply that FAJFs 
handle large amounts of commodities at low cost. In addition, the value- 
2. The data allow us to distinguish Japanese affiliates of foreign firms, but we  do not 
3. A similar table for 1991 is presented in Kimura and Baldwin (1998). 
4. Gross product is defined as the sum of employee compensation, profit-type return, net 
interest paid, indirect business taxes, and capital consumption allowances. It is thus slightly 
different from that for FAJFs. 
5.  In addition, the data from BS94 may be imprecise for several reasons. First, the number 
of FAJFs looks too small, which suggests that parent firms may not report all of their foreign 
affiliates. Second, by-destination sales shares may be biased toward exports because FAJFs 
may report exports even if they export through local affiliates of Japanese trading companies. 
The same bias may exist in the case of by-origin purchase shares. Moreover, official, contrac- 
tual flows of commodities do not necessarily coincide with physical commodity flows, and 
we  are not sure on which FAJFs base their answers. 
exclude them from our data set. Table 3.1  Comparison of Manufacturing and Commercial Affiliates: Japan and the United States, 1994 
By-Destination 
Shares in  By-Origin 
Sales  Value Added=  Valuc-  Valuc-  Sales (%)  Shares in 
Affiliates  ~~~l~~~~~~  Avcragc  Addcd  Addcd  Purchases (%) 
Millions  Millions  Number of  Ratiob  Productivity  Third 
Industry  Number  Percent  of Dollars  Percent  of Dollars  Percent  Number  Percent  Employees  (Oh)  ($1  Local  Japan1U.S.  Countries  Local  Imports 
Foreign Affiliates of Japancse Firms (FAJFs) 
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34.55  65.45 
33 77  65.23 
34.77  65.23 
34.76  65.24 
36.35  63.65 
Foreign Affiliates of US.  Firms (FAUSFs) 
By  parent compunies' 
clu.~.?iy7cation 
All industries  18,713  100.00  1,432,412  100.00  394,557  inn.00  5,572,600  100.00  298  27.54  70,803  66.91  10.48  22.61  n.a.  n.a. 




products  12,318  65.83  973,045  67.93  246,797  62.55  3,846,500  69.03  312  25.36  64,161  62 37  11.31  26.31  n.a.  n.a. 
(continued) Table 3.1  (continued) 
By-Destination 
Shares in  By-Origin 
Sales  Value Addea  Value-  Sales (YO)  Shares in 
Affiliates  E~~I~~~~~~  Average  Added  Value-Added  Purchases (Yo) 
Millions  Millions  Number of  Ratiob  Productivity  Third 
Industry  Number  Percent  of Dollars  Percent  of  Dollars  Percent  Number  Percent  Employees  (YO)  ($)  Local  Japan1U.S.  Countries  Local  Imports 
Foreign Affiliates of U.S. Firms (FAUSFs) 

































748  92,476  646  13,117 
6 19  63,468  443  6,294 
4.99  48,598  3.39  7,070 
1.28  29,008  2.03  6,823 
100.00  1,432,412  100.00  394,557 
37.80  776,257  54.19  244,345 
37.40  694,666  48.50  197,535 
29.26  422,423  29.49  73,846 
27.38  387,718  27.07  65,416 
25.59  296,549  20.70  47,367 
1.89  34,705  2.42  8,430 
3.32  553,400  9.93 
1.60  192,700  3.46 
1.79  185.700  3.33 
1.73  360,700  6.47 
100.00  5,572,600  100.00 
61.93  3,401,700  61.04 
5007  3,353,000  60 17 
18.72  1,006,900  18.07 
I658  560,600  1006 
12.01  526,400  9.45 
2.14  446,300  8.01 
396  14.18  23,703  n.a. 
166  9.92  32,662  n.a. 
199  14.55  38,072  69.76 
1,503  23.52  18,916  n.a. 
298  2754  70,803  6691 
481  3148  71,830  6208 
479  28.44  58,913  59 55 
184  17.48  73,340  71.52 
109  16.87  116,689  69.17 
110  15.97  89,983  68.69 
1,264  24.29  18,889  97.77 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a  n.a. 
8.97  21.27  n.a. 
5.79  n.a.  ma. 
10.48  22.61  n.a. 
12.99  24.92  n a. 
13.88  26.57  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
6.08  24.75  n.a. 
5.25  26.06  n.a. 












"Value added: for Japan, sales minus purchases; for United States, gross product. 
"Value-added ratio: (value added)lsales. 
'Value-added productivity: (value added)lemployment. Location and Internalization Decisions  87 
added share of wholesale trade FAJFs is as high as 37 percent while that 
of wholesale trade FAUSFs is only 17 percent. This suggests that efficient 
wholesale activities may be a source of profitability for Japanese MNEs. 
Second, wholesale trade parents have a much heavier weight among Japa- 
nese firms than among U.S. firms. The value-added share of foreign affil- 
iates of Japanese wholesale trade parents is 29 percent while that of U.S. 
wholesale trade parents is only 2 percent; the wholesale parents are much 
more important MNEs in Japan than in the United States. It should also 
be noted that foreign affiliates of Japanese wholesale or retail trade parents 
export large amounts to Japan, which  suggests that the wholesale and 
manufacturing activities involved in sending products back to Japan are 
important components of their operations. Overall, the comparison be- 
tween FAJFs and FAUSFs again suggests that sector switching of parent 
firms and foreign affiliates may reveal the characteristics of Japanese MNEs. 
3.3  Sector-Switching Analysis from the Foreign Affiliate Side 
In the following, we will go into the analysis of sector switching between 
parents and foreign affiliates by  using the questionnaire-level data under- 
lying BS94 (hereinafter the “MITI database”). In this section, we  look at 
the data from the affiliate side and try to connect our discussion with tra- 
ditional location choice analysis. 
Table 3.2 presents the number of FAJFs in East Asia, North America, 
and Western Europe, which covers more than 90 percent of all FAJFs in 
the world in terms of the number of FAJFs. The row denotes the industry 
of the parent firm, and the column denotes the industry of the FAJE6  For 
industry codes, see the appendix. Because many FAJFs belong to the same 
industries as their parents, large numbers are naturally found in the diago- 
nal cells of the table. In East Asia 673 FAJFs out of 975 (69 percent) are 
in the diagonal cells, in North America 409 out of 728 (56 percent), and 
in Western Europe 283 out of 552 (51 percent). The rest of the FAJFs be- 
long to industries different from those of their parents. Most sector switch- 
ing between parents and foreign affiliates occurs between the manufactur- 
ing sector (industries 120 to 340) and the wholesale trade sector (industry 
48 1). In North America and Western Europe, many wholesale trade FAJFs 
have manufacturing parent firms. In East Asia, a considerable number  of 
manufacturing FAJFs have wholesale trade parent firms. 
Table 3.3 presents reorganized information on the activities of FAJFs 
by location of FAJF and by industries of parent firm and FAJF. To sim- 
plify the table, industries are aggregated up to manufacturing (M) and 
6. The questionnaire of  BS94 asks for a detailed sales composition of each parent firm, 
and its industry is assigned by  following its largest sold commodity item. The industry of 
each FAJF is answered directly in the form of industry code. Table 3.2  Industries of Japanese Parent Firms and FAJFs, 1994 (number of foreign affiliates) 
East Asia: All Asian Countries East of Pakistan 
Industry of FAJF 
Industrv of 
Parent Firm  120  130  140  150  160  170  180  190  200  210  220  230  240  250  260  270  280  290  300  310  320  330 
120 
140 


































1  2  2 
12 
21 
71  2 






4  31031  2317117 
I  1  1  1  I 
1 






2  6 
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13 
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20 North America: United States and Canada 
Industry of FAJF 
Industry of 





~  ~~ 
I20  15  2  2  19 
I30  19  51  16 
140  4  4 
I50  1  11  3 
I60  1  2  3 
I70  1  2 
180  51  I  8 
190  4  21  7 
200  I  27  2  2  I  17  54 
210  0 
220  11  1  1  13 
230  18  41  14 
240  0 
250  I1  1  2  14 
260  61  1  33  15 
270  2  911  4  2  19 
280  1  2  13  23  21  24 
290  2  37  1  1  1  48  2  92 
300  1  1  1  141  13  I  33  2  85 
310  I4  69  22  96 
320  5  18  23 
330  2  2 
340  16  91  17 
050  0 
48 1  8  2  32 11  3  1  I  I2  10  5  I  6  I  123  6  177 
540  1  39  13 
Other  2  2  31  8 
Subtotal  24  13  6  3  4  1  5  9  33  0  18  12  0  15  7  13  19  46  57  89  10  0  II  4  303  26  0  728 
(continued) Table 3.2  (continued) 
~~ 
Western Europe  All Europe Excluding the Commonwealth of Independent States and Eastern European Countries 
Industry of FAJF 
Industry of 
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6  98 
37 
I  22 
0 
2  21 
0 
6  164 
9  9 
2 
27  0  552 
Daia owcc: MlTl database. 
Note. For industry codes, see the appendix Table 3.3  Foreign Affiliates of Japanese Parent Firms by  Industries of Parent and Affiliate, 1994 
~  _______  ~  ~~_______~  ~ 
Location of  By-Destination Shares  By-Origin 
Affiliate  and  Sales  Value Added  Value-  Value-  in Sales (Oh)  Shares in 
Industries of  Affiliates  Employment  Average  Added  Added  ~  Purchases (%) 
Parentand  ~  Millions of  Millions of  ~  Number of  Ratio  Productivity  Third  ~ 




















975  100.00 
6M)  67.69 
67  6.87 
138  14.15 
110  11.28 
728  100.00 
343  47.12 
187  25.69 
51  7.01 
147  20.19 
552  100.00 
185  33.51 
192  34.78 
41  7.43 































13,099  100.00  415.035 
9,106  69.51  288,310 
540  4.12  4,651 
4,014  30.64  110,244 
(560)  -4.28  11,830 
27,543  100.00  217,220 
11,053  40.13  148,413 
8,189  29.73  35,773 
1,848  6.71  20,396 
6,453  23.43  12,638 
12,771  100.00  97,201 
5,371  42.05  52,844 
3,486  27.29  16,607 
1,253  9.81  17,309 
2,662  20.84  10,441 
100.00  426  11.26 
69.47  437  26.82 
1.12  69  6.20 
26.56  799  32.55 
2.85  108  -0.91 
100.00  298  12.14 
68.32  433  25.81 
16.47  191  13.99 
9.39  400  14.73 
5.82  86  5.72 
100.00  176  8.54 
54.37  286  29.83 
17.09  86  13.92 
30.37  17.81  422 
















58.42  13.99 
50.48  18.71 
46.86  17.30 
59.85  23.17 
64.17  9.07 
78.64  12.12 
94.76  1.94 
96.90  1.08 
96.63  2.94 
61.05  22.74 
73.28  7.35 
58.06  1.31 
82.21  3.45 
90.76  2.24 














































Note:  See table 3.1 notes for definitions of value added. value-added ratio, and value-added productivily. 
'The industry ofthe parent firm is given first,  then the industry of  the affiliate.  M stands for  manufacturing, and N stands For  nonmanufacturing.  E.g., "MW  mednS that the parent firm IS  in the manufacturing 
sector and the affiliate in the nonmanufacturing sector. 92  Fukunari Kimura 
nonmanufacturing (N) sectors. Sectors of a parent firm and its FAJF are 
reported separated by a slash. 
Cases in which both the parent firm and the FAJF are in the manufac- 
turing sector (M/M) have a particularly large share in East Asia; in terms 
of number of FAJFs, 660 out of 975 (68 percent) follow this pattern. The 
shares in North America and Western Europe are only 47 and 34 percent, 
respectively. M/M-type FAJFs in East Asia sell a large portion of their 
products to Japan and third countries (the sales shares to Japan and third 
countries are 19 and 31 percent, respectively). These are consistent with 
the fact that East Asia has a strong locational advantage for manufactur- 
ing activities. From this table, however, vertical linkage among FAJFs can- 
not be detected directly. 
Cases in which the parent firm is in the manufacturing sector while the 
FAJF is in the nonmanufacturing  sector (M/N) are pervasive in North 
America and  Western Europe. M/N-type FAJFs account for 26 and 35 per- 
cent of FAJFs in these regions. They sell their products predominantly to 
local markets, which indicates that these regions are attractive as large, 
matured markets for their products and it is thus worth setting up whole- 
sale trade affiliates there. Their extremely high value-added productivity 
would be a reflection of their good commerce. In Western Europe, sales 
to local markets by M/N-type FAJFs are 82 percent while those by M/M- 
type FAJFs are 58 percent. Sales to third countries by  M/N-type FAJFs, 
on the other hand, are only 14 percent while those by M/M-type FAJFs 
are 41 percent. This means that manufacturing FAJFs are located only in 
selected countries in Europe, but wholesale trade FAJFs tend to be located 
in each country. There are only 67 M/N-type FAJFs in East Asia, of which 
50 are located in Hong Kong and Singapore (not shown in the table). The 
large share of sales to third countries and the large share of imports from 
abroad suggest that these FAJFs work as global distribution centers. East 
Asia is not yet a market attractive enough for Japanese MNEs to establish 
wholesale trade affiliates for local sales. 
Cases in which the parent firm is in the nonmanufacturing sector and 
the FAJF is in the manufacturing sector (N/M) are particularly important 
in East Asia, where 138 FAJFs out of 975 (14 percent) are of this type. 
Their share in terms of value added is as high as 31 percent. These FAJFs 
are characterized by large numbers of employees (799 persons on average), 
high value-added ratios (33 percent), and large proportions of sales to 
Japan (23 percent). N/M-type FAJFs make up only 7 percent of FAJFs in 
North America and Western Europe. 
Last, cases in which both the parent firm and the FAJF are in the non- 
manufacturing sector (N/N) have shares of 1 1, 20, and 24 percent in East 
Asia,  North America,  and  Western  Europe,  respectively,  in  terms  of 
number of affiliates. "type  FAJFs in North America and Western Eu- 
rope have very high value-added productivity and low value-added ratios, Location and Internalization Decisions  93 
which indicates that these FAJFs conduct pure trade intermediary func- 
tions with minimal storage functions. In addition,  N/N-type  FAJFs in 
East Asia and North America purchase a large portion of commodities 
from local markets and sell some of them to third countries and Japan. 
This suggests that some FAJFs of this type have purchasing functions. As 
for N/N-type FAJFs in Western Europe, their high local sales ratios and 
low ratios of sales to third countries suggest that FAJFs acting as distribu- 
tion affiliates are located in each country, rather than selling from large- 
scale distribution centers for the whole of Europe. 
In the usual location choice analysis, we simply check the industries and 
other characteristics of foreign affiliates and combine them with locational 
conditions. By introducing the industries of parent firms as we  do here, 
the firms’ strategies on location and internalization can be identified in a 
much richer manner. 
3.4  Sector-Switching Analysis from the Parent Firm Side 
Another way of looking at the same set of data is to analyze it from the 
parent firm side and to see what sort of foreign affiliates each parent firm 
has. Doing so, we  can investigate the overall strategies of internalization 
and location of each firm group to a great extent. The MlTI database pro- 
vides precious information of this sort. 
Table 3.4 presents the number of parent firms that have one or more 
than one foreign affiliates by industry of parent firm, together with the per- 
centages of parent firms that have at least one nonmanufacturing foreign 
affiliate in the case of  manufacturing parent firms and that have at least 
one manufacturing foreign affiliate in the case of nonmanufacturing par- 
ent firms. Out of 713 manufacturing parent firms, 408 have just one affil- 
iate, only  13 percent of which have a nonmanufacturing affiliate. On the 
other hand, 47 percent of manufacturing parent firms with more than one 
affiliate have at least one nonmanufacturing affiliate. As for nonmanufac- 
turing parent firms, 139 out of 232 have only one affiliate. The percentage 
having at least one manufacturing affiliate is 41  percent among parent 
firms with only one affiliate and 62 percent among parent firms with more 
than one affiliate. 
We would like to emphasize that when a manufacturing parent firm has 
only one affiliate, sector switching hardly  occurs. In addition, contrary 
to the conventional belief, parent firms in electric machinery (300) and 
transport equipment (3  10) do not show a particularly strong tendency to 
have nonmanufacturing foreign affiliates. These facts suggest that a con- 
siderable number of MNEs do not try to internalize wholesale trade activi- 
ties but instead concentrate on production activities in affiliates in order 
to supply parts and components to other firms. Some parent firms, on the 
other hand, tend to have both manufacturing and wholesale trade affiliates 94  Fukunari Kimura 
Table 3.4  Foreign Affiliate Ownership Patterns of Japanese Parent Firms, 1994 
(number  of parent firms) 
~~~~~~ 
With Only  With More Than 
Industry of  One Foreign  One Foreign 

































24  (16.67) 
12  (41.67) 
13  (7.69) 
14  (28.57) 
4  (0.00) 
7  (14.29) 
10  (20.00) 
12  (25.00) 
80  (25.00) 
3  (66.67) 
33  (6.06) 
17  (35.29) 
0  (n.a.) 
22  (9.09) 
17  (35.29) 
29  (10.34) 
36  (8.33) 
91  (45.05) 
145  (27.40) 
91  (24.44) 
28  (53.57) 
24  (58.33) 
713  (27.63) 
0  (n.a.) 
190  (53.68) 
32  (25.00) 
10  (50.00) 
232  (49.57) 
945  (33.01) 
1(100.00) 
15  (0.00) 
6 (16.67) 
9  (0.00) 
9 (11.11) 
3  (0.00) 




23  (8.70) 
8 (25.00) 
0  (n.a.) 
18  (0.00) 
14 (21.43) 
13  (0.00) 
20  (5.00) 
47 (27.66) 
84 (11.90) 
50  (8.00) 
13 (30.77) 
9 (22.22) 
0  (0.00) 
12 (33.33) 
408 (12.99) 





547 (20.1  1) 
9  (44.44) 
6  (66.67) 
4  (25.00) 
5  (60.00) 
1  (0.00) 
1  lOO.00) 
3  (33.33) 
3  (33.33) 
40  (40.00) 
1  lOO.00) 
10  (0.00) 
9  (44.44) 
0  (n.a.) 
4  (50.00) 
3 (100.00) 
16  (18.75) 
16  (12.50) 
44  (63.64) 
61  (49.18) 
41  (43.90) 
15  (73.33) 
12  (83.33) 
305  (47.21) 
0  (n.a.) 
85  (65.88) 
6  (0.00) 
93  (62.37) 
398  (50.75) 
1 (lOO.00) 
2 (100.00) 
Data source: MITI database. 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are percentages of parent firms having affiliates in a different 
industry, “Different industry” means the nonmanufacturing sector for parents in the manu- 
facturing sector and the manufacturing sector for parents in the nonmanufacturing sector. 
and form global production-distribution  networks. Internalization deci- 
sions are surely connected with the overall strategy of  MNEs. For non- 
manufacturing parent firms, the high percentage having manufacturing 
affiliates indicates that upward internalization is pervasive in the interna- 
tional context. Location and Internalization Decisions  95 
Because the number of foreign affiliates is expected to depend on the 
size of the parent firm, we classify parent firms by number of regular work- 
ers. Table 3.5 presents the data for manufacturing parent firms. The per- 
centage of having at least one nonmanufacturing affiliate is again shown 
in parentheses. The table indicates that small parent firms tend to have a 
small number of FAJFs and that parent firms tend not to have nonmanu- 
facturing affiliates when their number of affiliates is small. At the bottom 
of the table, the percentage of nonmanufacturing FAJFs is also shown, 
which goes up from 13 percent to more than 50 percent and then comes 
down to 40 percent as the number of affiliates increases. These figures sug- 
gest that the location and internalization strategies of Japanese manufac- 
turing parent firms may be classified into two categories. One is to concen- 
trate on manufacturing activities to supply intermediate goods to other 
firms, and the other is to establish a global production-distribution net- 
work by internalizing wholesale trade activities. Parent firms in the former 
category may maintain long-term relationships with clients even after es- 
tablishing affiliates abroad. 
Table 3.6 presents the data for nonmanufacturing Japanese parent firms 
in the same format as table 3.5. Again, small parent firms tend to have 
small numbers of foreign affiliates. A sharp contrast from the manufactur- 
ing parent firms is found in the percentage having affiliates in a different 
industry. Even if parent firms are small or even if the number of affiliates 
is small, there is still a strong tendency to have manufacturing affiliates. 
N/M activities may still be underestimated  here because the BS94 data 
include only majority-owned affiliates and large parent firms. On the other 
hand, there are GTCs with a large number of affiliates, both manufactur- 
ing and nonmanufacturing. The percentage  of  manufacturing affiliates 
comes down to 28 percent as the number of affiliates increases (shown at 
the bottom of the table). 
Table 3.7 summarizes major characteristics of Japanese manufacturing 
firms. In the table, firms located in Japan are classified into three groups: 
(a) firms without foreign affiliates, (b) firms with only manufacturing for- 
eign affiliates (no sector switching), and (c) firms with at least one non- 
manufacturing foreign affiliate (sector switching). The table reports the 
mean and standard deviation of each indicator for firms in Japan. Because 
the microdata have fat tails and some of the variables cannot be normally 
distributed, the means and standard deviations must be interpreted with 
caution. 
Table 3.7 reveals various features of Japanese manufacturing firms in 
the context of international operations. We would like to note the follow- 
ing four points in particular. First, groups a, b, and c clearly differ in firm 
size and capital-labor ratio. Manufacturing firms without foreign affiliates 
tend to have fewer regular workers, smaller total sales, and smaller ratios 
of tangible assets to regular workers than do those with foreign affiliates. Table 3.5  Foreign Atfiliate Ownership Patterns of Japanese Manufacturing Parent Firms, 1994 (number of parent firms) 
~~~  ~~ 
Number of  Number of Affiliates 
Regular Workers 
of Parent Firm  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  More Than 10 
50 to 99 
100 to 199 
200 to 299 
300 to 499 
500 to 999 


















































5  3  1 
(100.00)  (80.00)  (33.33) 
29  18  14  6  7  3  5  23 
(48.28)  (77.78)  (64.29)  (66.67)  (85.71)  (66.67)  (100.00)  (91.30) 
37  21  14  6  8  3  5  23 
(48.65)  (71.43)  (64.29)  (66.67)  (87.50)  (66.67)  (100.00)  (91.30) 
27.03  34.29  28.57  54.76  43.75  33.33  66.67  39.90 
Data source: MITI database. 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are numbers of manufacturing parent firms having at least one nonmanufacturing affiliate. Table 3.6 
Number of  Number of Affiliates 
Regular Workers 
of Parent Firm  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  MoreThan 10 
Foreign mate  Ownership Patterns of  Japanese Nonmanufacturing  Parent Firms, 1994 
50 to 99 
100 to 199 
200 to 299 
300 to 499 
500 to 999 



























































1  1 
6  2  1  4  1  8 
(1  00.00)  (100.00) 
(50.00)  (50.00)  (100.00)  (75.00)  (0.00)  (75.00) 
7  2  2  5  1  9 
(57.14)  (50.00)  (100.00)  (80.00)  (0.00)  (66.67) 
42.86  16.67  21.43  47.50  0.00  28.18 
~~ 
Data source: MITI database. 
Note:  Numbers in parentheses are numbers of nonmanufacturing parent firms having at least one manufacturing affiliate Table 3.7  Characteristics  of Japanese Manufacturing  Firms, 1994 
Characteristic 
Without  With  With Foreign Affiliates, 
Foreign  Foreign Affiliates,  At Least One Nonmanufacturing 
Affiliates  No Sector Switching  Foreign Affiliate 
(4  (b)  (c) 
Firm size 
Number of regular workers (number of persons) 
Total sales (million yen) 
Economic performance 
yen per person) 
Ratio of tangible assets to regular workers (million 
Ratio of operating surplus to total sales 
Foreign sales (1): 1 positive; 0 zero 




































(0.221  1) Product differentiation 
R&D expenditure (1): 1 positive; 0 zero 
R&D expenditure (2): ratio to total sales 
Ratio of advertisement expenditure to total sales 
Linkage 
Commissioning production: 1 yes; 0 no 
Using subcontractor(s): 1 yes; 0 no 
Working as a subcontractor: 1 yes; 0 no 















































Data source: MITI database. 
Note: Figures are unweighted averages. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 100  Fukunari Kimura 
Firms with foreign affiliates, particularly with nonmanufacturing foreign 
affiliates, are large in size and capital intensive. The difference between 
groups b and c in size reflects the average number of foreign affiliates, too; 
group b has 1.67 foreign affiliates on average while group c has 4.66. 
Second,  R&D and advertisement  expenditures also differ across the 
three groups. R&D expenditure (I) shows whether a firm has R&D expen- 
diture or not. It assigns the value one if  yes  and zero otherwise. Hence, 
the mean of R&D expenditure (1) indicates the probability of having posi- 
tive R&D expenditure. R&D expenditure (2), on the other hand, reports 
the ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales. The means of R&D expendi- 
tures (1) and (2) are smallest for firms without foreign affiliates and largest 
for firms with nonmanufacturing foreign affiliates. The ratio of advertise- 
ment expenditure to total sales shows the same pattern. These findings sug- 
gest that firms with foreign affiliates, particularly with nonmanufacturing 
foreign affiliates, think more about product differentiation than do firms 
without foreign affiliates. More product differentiation naturally generates 
more incentive for extensive internalization. 
Third, foreign sales also reveal contrasts among groups a, b,  and c. 
Again, foreign sales (I) indicates whether a firm has foreign sales or not, 
and thus the mean of foreign sales (1) is the probability of having positive 
foreign sales. Only 22 percent of firms without foreign affiliates have for- 
eign sales, while 82 and 95 percent of firms with foreign affiliates (without 
and with nonmanufacturing foreign affiliates, respectively) have foreign 
sales. Foreign sales (2) reports the ratio of foreign sales to total sales, which 
shows a large difference between the no-sector-switching case (9 percent) 
and the sector-switching case (22 percent). Remember that these foreign 
sales include both arm’s-length and intrafirm exports. Also note that the 
data are for just one time point and thus do not suggest any causal relation 
between exports and FDI. However, we  can at least confirm that the ten- 
dency to export and the tendency to invest abroad are highly correlated. 
Fourth, an interesting fact is that the mean ratios of operating surplus 
to total sales are almost the same for groups a, b, and c. This suggests that 
larger, more capital-intensive, more R&D- and advertisement-intensive, 
more foreign-exposed firms do not necessarily perform better. This obser- 
vation may indicate a sharp contrast with U.S. MNEs. In the case of the 
United States, Doms and Jensen (1998) asserted that MNE establishments 
owned by U.S. nationals show superior performance, compared with both 
U.S. affiliates of foreign firms and indigenous establishments without for- 
eign affiliates. Of course, here we  check just one indicator of firm perfor- 
mance using a single year’s data, so we  must  be careful in concluding 
anything definite. However, the finding at least suggests that the efficacy 
of small firms cannot be neglected. Firm size, capital intensity, degree of 
product differentiation, and foreign exposure are not direct indicators of 
firm performance but  rather  are choice variables indicating  how firms Location and Internalization Decisions  101 
adapt themselves to the economic environment. Both small and large firms 
adapt to survive, but in different ways. The key to understanding Japanese 
firms is the interfirm relationship and the degree of internalization. 
Table 3.8 displays the data for Japanese nonmanufacturing (wholesale 
and retail trade and restaurants) firms using the same format as table 3.7. 
We can again find a clear contrast between firms with and without foreign 
affiliates. Firms without foreign affiliates are on average smaller in terms 
of number of regular workers and total sales and have smaller R&D ex- 
penditure and smaller foreign sales. The contrast between the sector-switch- 
ing and no-sector-switching cases, however, is not very clear. Although 
R&D expenditure  and  foreign  sales are  larger in  the  sector-switching 
case than in the no-sector-switching case, average firm size is almost the 
same. Again, the mean ratios of operating surplus to total sales are almost 
the same for groups a, b, and c. 
We do not claim any simple causal relation among the indicators shown 
in tables 3.7 and 3.8. A firm is supposed to decide whether to have foreign 
affiliates or not and whether to have foreign affiliates in a different industry 
or not, jointly with decisions about its size, R&D, foreign sales, and other 
things. However, just  to see the controlled correlation among variables, 
some regression analysis is conducted. Table 3.9 reports the result of logit 
estimation for Japanese manufacturing firms.’ The dependent variable of 
the first two regressions is whether a firm has foreign affiliates or not. As 
expected, firms with foreign affiliates are likely to have large employment 
size, capital-intensive technology, large foreign sales, and large R&D ex- 
penditure. The coefficient for the ratio of advertisement expenditure is less 
significant than those for other variables. The second two regressions have 
as dependent variable whether or not a firm has nonmanufacturing foreign 
affiliates. Firms tend to switch sectors when they have large employment 
size, large foreign sales, and large R&D expenditure. Overall, the regres- 
sions confirm our casual observations about table 3.7, even after putting 
these variables together. 
Table 3.10 shows the result of logit estimation for Japanese nonmanu- 
facturing firms. It is confirmed that firms are likely to have foreign affiliates 
when they are large in employment size, have capital-intensive technol- 
ogy, and have large foreign sales. Whether sector switching occurs is only 
weakly explained by  the explanatory variables used here. 
3.5  Conclusion 
MNEs make location and internalization decisions jointly, and  thus 
it is  necessary to develop an empirical research strategy to treat  them 
jointly. To approach this task, this paper concentrates on sector switching 
7. The probit estimation provides similar results. Table 3.8  Characteristics of Japanese Nonmanufacturing  Firms, 1994 
Characteristic 
Without  With  With Foreign Affiliates, 
Foreign  Foreign Affiliates,  At Least One Manufacturing 
Affiliates  No Sector Switching  Foreign Affiliate 
(a)  (b)  (c) 
Firm size 
Number of regular workers (number of persons) 
Total sales (million yen) 
Economic performance 
yen per person) 
Ratio of tangible assets to regular workers (million 
Ratio of operating surplus to total sales 
Foreign sales (1): 1 positive; 0 zero 




































(0.2160) Product differentiation 
R&D expenditure (1): 1 positive; 0 zero 
R&D expenditure (2): ratio to total sales 
Ratio of advertisement expenditure to total sales 
Linkage 
Commissioning production: 1 yes; 0 no 
Using subcontractor(s): 1 yes; 0 no 
Working as a subcontractor: 1 yes; 0 no 















































Data source: MITI database. 
Note: Figures are unweighted averages. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Table 3.9  Logit Estimation: Japanese Manufacturing Parent Firms, 1994 
Variable 
Dependent Variables 
Having Foreign Affiliates = 1; 
Not Having Foreign Mliates = 0 
With Sector Switching = 1; 
Without Sector Switching = 0 
(1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
Constant 
Number of regular workers 
Ratio of tangible assets to regular workers 
Foreign sales (I): 1 positive; 0 zero 
Foreign sales (2): ratio to total sales 
R&D expenditure (1):  1 positive; 0 zero 
R&D expenditure (2): ratio to total sales 
















-  1,966.85 
-3.65014** 









































Data source: MITI database. 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
**Significant at the 1 percent level. Table 3.10  Logit Estimation: Japanese Nonmanufacturing Parent Firms, 1994 
Dependent Variables 
Having Foreign Affiliates = 1; 
Not Having Foreign Affiliates = 0 
With Sector Switching = 1; 
Without Sector Switching = 0 
(1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
Constant 
Number of regular workers 
Ratio of tangible assets to regular workers 
Foreign sales (1): 1 positive; 0 zero 
Foreign sales (2): ratio to total sales 
R&D expenditure (1):  I  positive; 0 zero 
R&D expenditure (2): ratio to total sales 















-685.9  15 
7,673 
-4.06981** 





















0.8704  1 ** 
(2.9593) 
-  11.1986 
(- 1.5971) 














-  130.727 
205 
Data source: MITI database. 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are ?-statistics. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
**Significant at the 1 percent level. 106  Fukunari Kimura 
of Japanese parent firms and foreign affiliates between manufacturing and 
nonmanufacturing. We  find that the industries of parent firms and affili- 
ates are often different and MNEs clearly choose internalization and loca- 
tion in a strategic manner. Large manufacturing parent firms tend to have 
both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing affiliates, the latter of which 
are mainly located in North America and Western Europe. Small manu- 
facturing parent firms and firms with a small number of affiliates are apt 
to concentrate on production activities at their affiliates, particularly in 
East Asia. About half of nonmanufacturing parent firms have at least one 
manufacturing affiliate, usually located in East Asia. Large nonmanufac- 
turing parent firms, mostly GTCs, have extensive networks of production 
and wholesale trade activities all over the world. Integrated studies of loca- 
tion and internalization decisions are essential to understanding the be- 
havior of MNEs. 
Although we must confront the limitations of statistical data, the MITI 
database at least allows us  access to various characteristics of Japanese 
parent firms and interactions between parent firms and their related for- 
eign affiliates. Further exploitation of  this information is what we  must 
work on in the future. 
Appendix 





















Beverages, tobacco, and animal feed 
Textiles 
Apparel 
Wood and wood products 
Furniture and fixtures 
Pulp, paper, and paper products 
Publishing and printing 
Chemicals 
Petroleum and coal products 
Plastic products 
Rubber products 
Leather and leather products 
Ceramics, clay, and stone products 
Iron and steel 
Nonferrous metal 
Metal products Location and Internalization Decisions  107 
290  General machinery 
300  Electric machinery 
3  10  Transport equipment 
320  Precision machinery 
330  Arms 
340  Other manufacturing 
Nonmanufacturing sector 
050  Mining 
481  Wholesale trade 
540  Retail trade 
Other  Services and other 
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Comment  Eiji Ogawa 
Kimura uses microdata from MITI’s Basic Survey of Business Structure 
and Activity to study empirically the location and internalization deci- 
sions made by Japanese multinational enterprises. He focuses on the sec- 
toral choices of parent firms and foreign affiliates between manufacturing 
and nonmanufacturing including wholesale and retail trade. 
Kimura points out some “stylized facts” about Japanese multinational 
enterprises in this paper. First, many Japanese manufacturers have whole- 
sale trade foreign affiliates. This is downward internalization, that is, sector 
switching from  manufacturing  to nonmanufacturing  (M/N  type).  Sec- 
ond, Japanese multinational enterprises keep subcontracting relationships 
as loose internalization arrangements. This is  a no-sector-switching case 
(M/M type). Third, a number of Japanese wholesale and retail trade com- 
panies establish manufacturing plants, particularly in East Asia. This is 
upward internalization, that is, sector switching from nonmanufacturing 
to manufacturing (N/M type). Finally, GTCs are one of the major compo- 
nents of the Japanese economic system. The author points out that GTCs 
work as a device through which other, client companies can avoid inter- 
nalization of the distribution function, that is, switching to nonmanufac- 
turing. 
These  stylized facts  suggest  that  Japanese multinational  enterprises 
could display all types of sector switching. Kimura uses the microdata to 
analyze formally these stylized facts. 
He obtains four findings. First, for the M/M type, both large and small 
manufacturing firms tend to have manufacturing affiliates, mainly located 
in East Asia. Second, for the M/N type of sector switching, large manufac- 
turing parent firms tend to have nonmanufacturing affiliates, mainly lo- 
cated in North America and Western Europe. Third, for the N/M type, 
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about half of large and small nonmanufacturing parent firms have manu- 
facturing affiliates, mainly located in East Asia. Last, GTCs have extensive 
networks of production and wholesale activities all over the world (N/N 
and N/M types). Thus the pattern of sector switching depends on the size 
of  the parent firm and the location of affiliates. I summarize Kimura’s 
findings in figure 3C. 1. 
I have two comments. The first is about the relation between parent firm 
size and sector switching. Figure 3C. 1 shows that no small manufacturing 
firms have nonmanufacturing affiliates. Large manufacturing firms enjoy 
economies of  scale and scope and can afford to take the risk of  sector 
switching by diversifying the risk. Small manufacturing firms cannot take 
the risk of sector switching. Small manufacturing firms avoid taking the 
risk by  using GTC networks. How does Kimura interpret the finding that 
small manufacturing firms have manufacturing affiliates but do not have 
any nonmanufacturing affiliates? 
My second comment is related to the location of foreign affiliates. Both 
manufacturing and nonmanufacturing parent firms have manufacturing 
affiliates, mainly located in East Asia. In contrast, nonmanufacturing affil- 
iates held  by  manufacturing parent  firms are mainly located in North 
America and Western Europe. How do we  explain the asymmetric loca- 
tion patterns of sector switching? 
I will explain the asymmetry from the viewpoint of the fixed and sunk 
costs of setting up a wholesale and retail network or distribution network 
in a foreign country. These fixed and sunk costs give firms more incentive 
to invest in wholesale and  retail affiliates in larger markets. Therefore, 110  Fukunari Kimura 
manufacturing parent firms hold their own trading affiliates only in large 
markets such as North America and Western Europe. In small markets, 
such as in the Asian countries, they do not hold their own trading affiliates 
and use the wholesale networks of GTCs instead. How does Kimura ex- 
plain the asymmetry? 
Comment  Hock Guan Ng 
Kimura puts forward a challenging idea to treat the location and internal- 
ization decisions of MNEs jointly. It is claimed in the paper that sector 
switching or nonswitching between manufacturing and nonmanufacturing 
reveals such joint decision making by Japanese MNEs. 
The data presented on the sector switching of Japanese MNEs that are 
grouped according to the location of their foreign affiliates reveal some 
interesting  patterns. Of  note is the observation that  the M/N  type  of 
FAJFs are pervasive in the United States and Western Europe but  are 
scarce in East Asia, with the exception of Hong Kong and Singapore. This 
suggests that manufacturing parents find it worthwhile to set up trade af- 
filiates only in economies with strong purchasing power. Perhaps a break- 
down according to countries sorted by per capita GNP will confirm this. 
Similarly, the N/M type of  FAJFs are highly represented in East Asia but 
are hardly found in the United States and Western Europe. This indicates 
that nonmanufacturing parents seek to locate their manufacturing affili- 
ates in countries with cheap labor, so sorting the locations by labor cost 
might be useful. 
While it is obvious to expect larger parent firms to have more foreign 
affiliates, the strength of this relation is hard to gauge without any formal 
statistical test. Regressing the number of foreign affiliates on parent firm 
size (while controlling for other determinants) would be useful in this re- 
spect. 
The relation between the number of foreign affiliates and the incidence 
of sector switching is also not investigated fully. The numbers in the last 
rows of tables 3.5 and 3.6 give the impression that any such relation is 
probably weak, but further statistical modeling is needed to confirm this. 
In presenting the results of logit regressions in tables 3.9 and 3.10, the 
author concedes that he is not claiming any causal relation among the 
variables. The estimation equations as modeled, however, have to be inter- 
preted as showing the determinants of parent firm decisions on whether 
to have foreign affiliates and whether to switch sectors. As such, it cannot 
be claimed that “firms with foreign affiliates are likely to have large em- 
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ployment size, capital-intensive technology, large foreign sales, and large 
R&D expenditure.” The estimated equation has assumed causality in the 
opposite direction. 
To  correctly model a joint decision about switching, firm size, R&D 
expenditure, and the like, a simultaneous-equation framework is required. 
Estimating a single-equation model does not allow any meaningful con- 
clusions about the behavior of MNEs that make location and internaliza- 
tion decisions jointly. 